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Abstract
A recent literature suggests that arbitrarily designed administrative borders are an important rea-
son why sub-Saharan Africa remains one of the least developed regions on the globe. Accordingly,
administrative border reforms may be a way to promote growth on the African continent. In this pa-
per, we study the effect of subnational administrative border reforms on local economic development
(proxied by nighttime luminosity) by tracking state–level border changes in Africa during 1992-2013
with GIS techniques. Difference-in-difference regressions suggest that mergers have strong positive
effects on economic development. Splits, too, have positive effects, but they are substantially smaller
on average. To understand why the economic impact of splits and mergers differs in magnitude, we
investigate transmission channels. We link border changes to geocoded conflict data and survey ev-
idence on political attitudes as well as service delivery. We find that the differences between splits
and mergers are possibly due to different underlying motives for these two types of border reforms.
Splits seem to affect development through higher political stability, i.e. a lower incidence of con-
flicts and more benign political attitudes of citizens, while mergers presumably work through an
improvement in administrative efficiency.
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1 Introduction
A large literature suggests that legacy of the colonial period continues to impair African development.
Two main channels have been identified: low contemporary government quality as a consequence of
extractive institutions put in place by colonial powers (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Acemoglu and John-
son, 2005) and the slave trade, which ostensibly led to a persistent decline in public trust (Nunn and
Wantchekon, 2011). Yet, while these are widely accepted explanations for African underdevelopment,
they carry with them the discouraging implication that policy makers can do little – at least in the short
to medium run – to promote economic progress on the continent: if prevailing levels of trust and insti-
tutions are pre-determined by events that lie hundreds of years in the past, even the most well-crafted
polices will likely prove incapable to reverse the economic fortunes of African countries in the foresee-
able future.
Perhaps because of this absence of practical policy implications, attention has recently shifted to an-
other possible cause for African under-development: ill-designed administrative borders. In the scramble
for Africa, colonial borders were drawn and spheres of influence determined by the European colonizers
with little regard for the ethnic markup of the affected regions nor any other economic or political con-
cerns of the African populations (Thomson, 2010). These borders were inherited by the newly formed
African nation states after decolonization and have hardly changed ever since. The traditional home-
lands of many ethnic groups in contemporary Africa are hence split by arbitrary borders. At the same
time, disparate groups are forced within the administrative confines of political jurisdictions to which
they may harbor little allegiance. These circumstances are a natural breeding ground for political insta-
bility and obvious impediments to development. Indeed, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2016) show
that the arbitrary nature of African national borders continues to be source of conflict and economic
inefficiency on the continent.
If ill-drawn borders are one reason for African under-development, then the implied solution appears
to be to simply reshape these borders. Several authors indeed bemoan a secessionist deficit on the
continent (for instance, Englebert and Hummel (2005)). However, as national borders have essentially
remained the same since decolonization, it is difficult to predict whether a reshaping of African borders
will change the economic fortunes of the continent1 – nor is it obvious how exactly borders should be
reshaped. Should countries be split up into smaller nations or merged into larger supranational units?
In addition, on a more practical level, it is not easy to change national borders and any attempts in this
regard may have unforeseeable consequences.
Accordingly, if administrative border changes are one remedy to the current economic ills of Africa,
they may be more feasible and more effective at the subnational rather than the national level. In this
paper, we hence study first-level subnational border changes in Africa to advance our understanding of
how territorial reorganizations may affect economic development on the continent. Unlike national bor-
ders, the borders of first-level subnational units in Africa – typically labeled states, regions, or provinces
– were frequently changed in shape and structure over the last decades (Grossman et al., 2017; Fox
1The only secession on the continent in our sample took place in 2011, when South Sudan split from Sudan.
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and Gurley, 2006).2 These border changes were nominally often part of broader public sector reforms
(Erk, 2014) or deliberate attempts to adjust administrative borders such that they better reflect the ethno-
linguistic markup of the country (Fessha, 2012).3 In any case, they provide a wealth of identifying
variation to explore how administrative splits and mergers affect African development. At the same
time, the first-level subnational units share many of the traits of national governments. They are gener-
ally important administrative units with an independent political life and their territorial organization is
often a source of persistent controversy and conflict (Elaigwu, 2008).
In the empirical part of the paper, we identify subnational border changes by making use of shapefiles
on administrative borders from the United Nations’ Global Administrative Unit Layers (GAUL) project.
The shapefiles are available for every year during the period 1992-2013 and indicate the borders of all
first-level subnational units (henceforth referred to as regions) across the globe in a given year. Conse-
quently, any changes to the line features that indicate borders from one to the next year imply a border
change. After identifying these changes with GIS software, we classify them into splits or mergers de-
pending on whether a new line feature emerged (split) or an existing feature vanished (merger) within
an existing region.
A challenge for the subsequent analysis is to determine the unit of analysis. We cannot use the
subnational regions themselves as units of analysis as those regions that are affected by a border change
by definition cease to exist in their current form. This prevents us from constructing a consistent time
series at the level of subnational regions.4 We address this issue by dividing all of Africa into a grid
of 1 × 1 degree pixels (about 110km × 110km). We then use these pixels as time-constant units of
analysis in the estimations.5 Specifically, we project the the changes to the line features identified from
the GAUL dataset onto this grid of pixel to determine whether a particular pixel (or more specifically
the territory it is overlayed on) was affected by a a split or a merger.
Another challenge is how to measure economic performance at the subnational level. First, as sug-
gested by Jerven (2013), GDP calculations for developing countries are questionable due to poor statis-
tical capacity. Moreover, even if existing GDP data were reliable, it is typically not available at lower
levels of geography, notably not at the pixel-level. We thus follow recent research and use night light lu-
minosity as measured by orbital satellites as proxy for economic performance (Henderson et al., 2012).
2Gottlieb et al. (2016) report the development of average numbers of subnational units per country for all developing
countries over time. Sub-Saharan and North African countries as well as Near East countries experienced significant increases
in the number of subnational units whereas nations in South Asia, Latin America or in the East Asian and Pacific Area had – on
average – fairly stable subnational government unit numbers or even consolidated their local governments in the past decades.
Large decreases in the number of subnational governments in Eastern Europe were due to new independent nations at the end
of 1980s.
3However, there were also exceptional cases, for example in Rwanda, border changes were also implemented as an delib-
erate attempt to dilute subnational ethnic homogeneity.
4That is, if a existing region A is split into two new regions called B and C, the region A ceases to exist.
5The area covered by a pixel (12,100km2) roughly corresponds to the size of Los Angeles county (12,305km2). We choose
this pixel size as baseline for two reasons. First, it is sufficiently large to capture the aggregate effects of border changes (rather
than only effects immediately at the border). If e. g. a merger leads to cost-savings, the positive implications should spread
over the entirety of the affected regions. On the other hand, this pixel size is also sufficiently small as to not dilute the effect of
border changes if they are mostly local (the 1 × 1 degree pixels are smaller than the average subnational region in Africa).
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Specifically, we calculate average light output in all 1 × 1 degree pixels for each year between 1992 to
2013 and match this data to the pixel-level data on subnational border changes.
Interpreting border changes as policy treatments, we then implement a difference-in-differences de-
sign at the pixel level as our baseline specification. Specifically, we explore whether pixels that were
affected by a split or merger witness an improvement or deterioration in their economic conditions,
as proxied by pixel-level night light luminosity. Our results indicate that mergers led to higher night
light output in the post-treatment period. In our baseline specification, mergers increased pixel-level
luminosity by about 42%. Using the estimate for the elasticity between night lights and GDP of 0.3
by Henderson et al. (2012), we calculate that pixel-level GDP increases in the long-run on average by
12.6% because of a merger. We find smaller, albeit still positive, effects for splits: luminosity increases
by 13%, which translates to an increase in GDP by 3.9%.
One inherent limitation of our setting is that border changes are not random events. Accordingly, one
obvious concern is that pixels (or regions) affected by a border change were on a different economic
trajectory than unaffected pixels. If border changes are endogenous to economic developments, our
estimates may be confounded. In fact, as mentioned above, policy makers often couch border changes
in the language of decentralization and government efficiency. If this is indeed their true motive, then we
would expect that regions facing economic difficulties are more likely to be subject to border changes.6
On the other hand, non-economic, and in particular political concerns, often appear in practice to be main
motivation for border changes. Hassan (2013), for example, notes that the creation of new administrative
units (splits) in many African countries follows an electoral cycle.7 To the extent that border changes
are orthogonal to economic concerns, our empirical approach can produce unbiased estimates.
Overall, it is plausible that there will be a number of border changes in our sample that were im-
plemented for economic reasons. It is not feasible to address such endogeneity concerns in our cross-
country context by means of a quasi-experiment as there is no institutional mechanism that would induce
quasi-random variation in subnational border changes across all of Africa. While we acknowledge this
limitation, we attempt to address it to the extent possible. First, we verify the common trend assump-
tion using event-study plots. We observe no systematic trends in night lights before splits or mergers,
suggesting that border changes were at least not overwhelmingly driven by systematic differences in
economic trajectories. Second, we estimate regressions where we control for country-level year effects
to account for country-specific economic developments. Third, we control for a number of observable
time-varying covariates. In these last two specifications, we again obtain similar results as in our baseline
model.
Another noteworthy issue is that the magnitudes of the treatment effects for splits and mergers are
noticeably different. This difference suggests the possibility that these two forms of border changes
affect night lights through different channels. Exploring mechanisms, we indeed find evidence for this.
6The direction of the bias is unclear. On the one hand, if any economic difficulties persist to the period after the border
change, the estimated treatment effect may be biased downward. On the other hand, there may also be a mean-reversion in the
economic fortunes of a region, leading us to over-estimate the treatment effect.
7 Hassan (2013) shows for Kenya that administrative units were formed to allow the central government to better target
public resources to electorally decisive ethnic groups and to foster clientelistic networks.
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One important motive as to why splits are implemented appears to be to increase political stability.
Specifically, we observe a lower incidence of conflicts after splits.8 Substantial evidence suggests that
(violent) conflicts have negative economic implications (Cerra and Saxena, 2008; Abadie and Gardeaz-
abal, 2003). Hence, the first-order effects of splits on political stability ostensibly have positive, even if
relatively small, implications for development.
For mergers, concerns of political stability appear to be unimportant. We observe no effects on con-
flicts nor any heterogeneity in treatment effects between ethnically homogeneous and heterogeneous
regions. We also find no robust effects on public service delivery using geocoded survey evidence. On
the other hand, we find that mergers are particularly effective in countries that have a higher bureaucratic
quality. These results suggest that mergers are primarily implemented to improve local administrative
efficiency with an aim to make better use of limited public resources (i. e. affected regions maintaining
similar levels of public services with presumably lower administrative overhead). This appears to be the
main reason why economic implications of mergers are more positive than those of splits.
One drawback of our analysis of mechanisms is that, given the data limitations, we cannot provide
direct evidence on whether mergers indeed improve administrative efficiency. Accordingly, the evidence
for this channel is mostly indirect. The fact that the effect is more pronounced in countries with higher
bureaucratic quality, however, implies that mergers are especially successful in countries that value ad-
ministrative efficiency. Similarly, we cannot rule out other plausible channels through which both splits
and mergers may affect development. For example, it is possible that splits, too, lead to improvements
in administrative efficiency if they result in a better targeted provision of public goods (Oates, 1999).
Mergers, on the other hand, may restrict inefficient inter-jurisdictional competition (Burgess et al., 2012).
However, those channels that we pinpoint – reduced ethnic conflicts in the case of splits and increased
administrative efficiency – are plausible and have been shown to be relevant in other contexts (e. g. in
studies of mergers in industrialized countries Reingewertz (2012)).
This paper contributes to various strands of literature. First, our results are related to the emerging
literature on subnational border changes in the developing world and their implications for economic
outcomes (Burgess et al., 2012; Asher and Novosad, 2015; Swee, 2015; Grossman et al., 2017; Lipscomb
and Mobarak, 2017).9 For example, Asher and Novosad (2015) find that in India, living conditions in
new states that were carved out of existing states improve after the split. Swee (2015) finds that the
partitions of municipalities after the Bosnian War led to an improvement in schooling outcomes. On the
other hand, as indicated above, administrative splits can also lead to harmful externalities and a race to
the bottom through intensified jurisdictional competition. For example, Burgess et al. (2012) show that
more government units in Indonesia exacerbate deforestation. Similarly, Lipscomb and Mobarak (2017)
find evidence of negative water pollution spillovers after splits of counties in Brazil.
8This result is similar to what has been found for splits of administrative units in Indonesia (Bazzi and Gudgeon, 2016;
Bazzi et al., 2018).
9Some papers address the consequences of administrative splits on politics or conflict activity. For instance, Bazzi and
Gudgeon (2016) show that splits can reduce the incidence of conflicts in Indonesia. According to Bazzi et al. (2018) this effect
only holds for administrative splits which increase the ethnic diversity of the local population. Moreover, Gottlieb et al. (2016)
find evidence that administrative splits in Senegal are done for re-election purposes.
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We contribute to this literature by linking border changes to aggregate economic performance (and
other outcomes) at the subnational level in Africa. While there are prior studies that explore how border
changes affect economic outcomes in Africa, we are the first to study their consequence at the subna-
tional level for all countries on the continent.10 We are also the first to study the economic consequences
of both administrative splits and mergers in a joint framework. Most of the previous literature has fo-
cused primarily on splits of administrative units, arguably because they are the more common form of
border change in the developing world (Grossman and Lewis, 2014; Grossman et al., 2017). However,
as we show below, there were also a significant number of mergers in Africa. Finally, we are able to tie
differences in the economic implications of mergers and splits to at least some underlying channels and
thus identify relevant mechanisms of border reforms on economic development.11
By studying administrative mergers, this paper is also related to the literature on the economic con-
sequences of amalgamations of administrative units. The existing studies on this question focus on
local governments in industrialized countries. For example, Loumeau et al. (2017) show that munici-
pal mergers have a positive net effect for economic activity in Germany. Pickering et al. (2016) find
similar evidence for Japan. Blesse and Baskaran (2016) find that (voluntary) municipal mergers do not
reduce local government costs and expenditures. Reingewertz (2012), on the other hand, shows that
mergers significantly reduce local expenditures in Israel. While this strand of literature explores mostly
mergers of local governments, there are ongoing debates in developed countries such as Germany about
whether higher-level units, notably some of the states (La¨nder), should be merged in order to achieve
cost-savings and more efficient governance (Blesse and Heinemann, 2018).12
This paper also contributes to the literature on the optimal size of political jurisdictions. This question
is tied to the discussion on fiscal federalism and decentralization (Oates, 1999). On the one hand, the
costs associated with the heterogeneity in preferences of the population likely increase with the size of
a region. On the other hand, larger regional units presumably imply more cost-effective provision of
public goods due to scale economies (Bolton and Roland, 1997; Alesina and Spolaore, 1997). A further
consideration against smaller (and hence more) regional units is, as alluded above, that they would imply
stronger inter-jurisdictional competition, which may lead to inefficient aggregate equilibria (Zodrow and
Mieszkowski, 1986).
Finally, this paper is also related to the recent literature that makes use of African national borders
in the context of economic development.13 For example, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) docu-
ment an association between pre-colonial ethnic institutions and regional development. Michalopoulos
and Papaioannou (2016) study the long-run implications of the scramble for Africa by focusing on eth-
10Grossman et al. (2017), for example, finds that an increase in the number of state administrations per country (i. e.
administrative unit proliferation due to splits) improves health outcomes. However, this analysis is conducted at the aggregate
(national) level.
11Other related work includes Shenoy (2018) who finds ambiguous results regarding economic activity around newly
established borders after splits of Indian provinces.
12Sparked by recent events such as the referendum on the partition of Catalonia from Spain, a related literature discusses
more broadly the causes and economic effects of secessions in industrialized countries (Gehring et al., 2017).
13McCauley and Posner (2015) give an overview of quasi-experimental studies of African borders on various outcomes.
However, subnational borders have been rarely studied for Africa.
6
nicities that were split by arbitrarily drawn national borders. Similarly, Huillery (2009) shows that the
effects of colonial investments have lasting effects, affecting contemporaneous education outcomes and
infrastructure provision in West Africa. Looking beyond Africa, it has also been found that pre-industrial
border fragmentation had a positive effect in long-run economic development of Europe, primarily be-
cause of the importance of natural borders on this continent (Lagerlo¨f, 2014; Kitamura and Lagerlo¨f,
2016).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section provides some background on
subnational border changes in Africa over the last two decades. Section 3 introduces the data and dis-
cusses our empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the main results and Section 5 discusses mechanisms.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Historical background on border design in Africa
Many developing countries exhibit an artificial mapping of administrative borders inherited from colo-
nial times. This problem is particularly prevalent in African countries (see Easterly and Levine (1997)
for early evidence on the topic). Since the “scramble for Africa” in the late 19th century, African borders
often follow latitudes and longitudes lines rather than natural borders (e.g. rivers) and do not coincide
with the historical territories of the local ethnicities. Alesina et al. (2011) note that about 80% of African
national borders can be categorized as such artificial lines. As for the main motives of these artificial
borders, Pierskalla et al. (2017) point to the desire of the former colonial powers to effectively extract of
resources as well as the wish to maintain political stability and exert territorial control.
With decolonization in the aftermath of World War II, independent nation states emerged on the
African continent. These new nations kept the arbitrary national borders drawn by the colonial powers.
Moreover, in their aim to mold the disparate ethnicities into unified nations and to engage in nation
building, most African countries opted for a unitary model of governments rater than federalism.14 These
decisions reverberate to this day and manifest themselves in substantial ethnic fragmentation within and
across political jurisdictions and sub-optimal state organization, both of which have been shown to lie at
the heart of the continent’s dismal economic performance (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016).
In the absence of changes to the borders of the nation states in our sample period (except for the
split of South Sudan in 2011), subnational border changes by mergers or splits of administrative regions
might provide a partial remedy for these impediments to development. However, in marked contrast
to national borders15, little attention has been devoted in the literature to African subnational borders.
There is to our knowledge no comprehensive history of subnational border formation and evolution in
Africa. Accordingly, little is known about how they were determined at the dawn of independence as
well why (and why not) they were adjusted during the post-independence history of Africa.
14First, only three African countries (Ethiopia, Nigeria and Sudan) can be characterized as federations (Treisman, 2008).
Second, African federalism is considered to be ineffective. National governments generally do not honor the constitutional
arrangements and are reluctant to provide autonomy for ethnic minorities (Fessha, 2012).
15For a survey of empirical applications, see McCauley and Posner (2015).
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It is plausible that the borders African countries inherited were as arbitrary as their national borders.
Several pieces of evidence are consistent with this notion. First, there are well-known cases such as
Nigeria, where the British created two regions (northern and southern) for which the common border
traces the 7
◦
10′ line of latitude (Berger, 2009). Second, while subnational border changes have been
significantly more common than national border changes in Africa (Law, 1999), eyeballing Figure 1
reveals that subnational borders, too, often follow straight lines even in 2013. Hence, despite all adjust-
ments that have been made in the post-independence periods, traces of the arbitrary nature of subnational
borders seem to persist to this day.16
Second, the available anecdotal evidence on the creation of (new) subnational entities and the def-
inition of their boundaries suggests that these were contentious negotiations in which the interests of
several actors had to be taken into account. If various concerns needed to be simultaneously addressed,
it is plausible that the resulting borders were neither politically nor economically optimal. An exam-
ple is the creation of the provinces in South Africa during the transition to democracy after Apartheid.
As Makgetla and Jackson (2010) note, the constitutional committee tasked with the delimitation of the
provinces had to balance several political concerns (e. g. to gerrymander the provinces such that influ-
ential stakeholders would maximize their electoral clout as well as to respect the settlement patterns of
ethnic and linguistic groups) and the need to create states that were economically viable.17
2.2 State-level border changes in Africa
We identify border changes using shapefiles from the GAUL project. This project provides shapefiles
with the subnational boundaries of all countries on the globe. This data is updated annually and hence
border changes and their precise location can be identified on a year-by-year basis by comparing shape-
files from two years (we describe the data in more detail below).
According to the GAUL data, border reforms at the state-level have been a frequent phenomenon in
Africa in the last two decades.18 Figure 1 shows the first-tier subnational boundaries in African coun-
tries in 1992 and 2013. As is obvious from this figure, subnational borders have changed significantly
in several countries. Moreover, different types of border changes could be observed. The most straight-
16In the online appendix, we also follow Alesina et al. (2011) to asses the arbitrariness of subnational borders in a quantita-
tive fashion. Alesina et al. (2011) argue that more “squiggly” borders are less arbitrary as they arguably reflect ancestral local
ethnic settlement patterns. They consequently propose to calculate a measure for the squigglyness of a country’s border that
is based on a box counting method. Applying their method to regional borders in Africa, we find that they are less squiggly –
more arbitrary– than regional borders in Europe. See the online appendix for more details.
17For example, the National Party (NP) supported the creation of the Northern Cape province as its demographics would
seem to give it an electoral edge against the African National Congress (ANC) in provincial elections. Makgetla and Jackson
(2010) state: “... technical committee members did not envision a Northern Cape, instead drawing a boundary between the
Western Cape and North-West province. ANC members on the technical team noted that the Northern Cape had no history
of local administration and that the cost of governing the sparse population, coupled with the region’s modest local revenue,
would make a provincial government’s work additionally difficult.” In the end, politics trumped the economic concerns and
the Northern Cape province was created.
18See also Table 1 in Grossman and Lewis (2014) for important trends in administrative proliferation of local governments,
i.e. at the state, district or municipal level, in Sub-Saharan Africa. This source, however, gives no information on mergers of
subnational governments in the area.
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forward type of border change is the split of an existing region into two or more regions. In these cases,
the name of the original region can be retained by one of the new regions or both regions receive new
names. The original name is typically retained by one of the new regions if one of the newly created
regions is relatively small (i. e. if the split was a secession of a small part of a larger region).
The opposite type of border change is a merger of two or more existing regions into one larger entity.
In these cases, either an entirely new region is created or an existing (typically large) region absorbs
smaller regions. Finally, a third type of border change combines both mergers and splits. In these cases,
regions are completely re-aligned.
According to the GAUL data, the number of regions in 1992 was 685. It has increased by 80 re-
gions to 765 (10.5%) by 2013 (see Figure 2). Figure 3 shows that altogether 22 out of 48 countries in
our sample were subject to some form of border reform at the state-level, i.e. to either administrative
mergers or splits. Table 1 gives an overview of the affected countries per year and type of reform being
implemented. The table also suggests that some countries experienced several border reforms. As there
were more splits than mergers, the number of regions in Africa has increased on average as illustrated in
Figure 2. 113 regions (according to the map in 1992) were affected by splits (16.4% of all regions) and
97 by mergers (14.1% of all regions) during our sample period.19
Figure 1 shows that in countries such as Egypt and Burundi, border changes were ostensibly isolated
events that affected only a few regions. In other countries, for example Burkina Faso and Ethiopia,
border changes affected the entire country and were ostensibly part of broader reforms.
The reasons for the border changes are specific to the country in question. In Burkina Faso, for
example, a territorial reorganization was initiated in 2001 that saw the introduction of a new tier of
government – called regions – that encompassed the old provinces. These changes were part of a wider
public sector reform to improve administrative efficiency. In Rwanda, in contrast, the boundaries of the
provinces were completely redrawn in 2006 in a deliberate attempt to reduce the degree of within-region
ethnic homogeneity.
In other cases, countries implemented administrative splits to re-centralize power to the national tier as
well as to reduce the intergovernmental bargaining power of the subnational units (Grossman and Lewis,
2014). Splits were also implemented for electoral reasons (Resnick, 2017), in particular to facilitate
targeted fiscal transfers of the central government to specific voter groups in the new (and smaller)
administrative unit (Hassan, 2013; Gottlieb et al., 2016), to strengthen relationships with local elites
(Green, 2010), or to address ethnic grievances (Pierskalla, 2016).
Overall, it is plausible that subnational splits and mergers will affect economic outcomes. One of the
goals that policy makers often claim to pursue with border reforms is an improvement in administrative
efficiency. However, from a purely efficiency perspective, it is unclear what the optimal number and
size of subnational regions is. As discussed above, larger regions may allow for the exploitation of
scale economies. Duplications of bureaucratic activity can be avoided and a common administration
should facilitate economic transactions. On the other hand, larger administrative units also imply that
government is farther away from its citizens and arguably less responsive to local needs. In turn, policies
may be too uniform to be able to realize the full growth potential of a region. The disadvantages of
19Note that 38 regions experience both mergers and splits at some point.
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larger government units may be arguably even more pronounced with respect to service delivery. Public
officials may be less accountable to local needs if they are responsible for larger geographical areas.
Moreover, there are also political economy concerns. Ethnic fragmentation can be higher in larger units
and peripheral areas may be more likely to be marginalized and neglected in the allocation of public
resources (Grossman and Lewis, 2014).
Related to the previous point, border reforms will likely also affect political attitudes. Research on
municipal amalgamations in industrialized countries indicates that mergers can be unpopular in the
affected municipalities and lead to political unrest (Lapointe, 2015), a decrease in political efficacy
(Lassen and Serritzlew, 2011), and trust (Hansen, 2013). On the other hand, splits of administrative
units are often acceptable to or even desired by the affected citizens.20 Accordingly, they may improve
citizens’ satisfaction with the (central) government (Hansen, 2015). The ensuing political stability may
then have positive effects on economic performance that outweigh, at least in certain circumstances, the
potential administrative inefficiencies associated with smaller government units.21
3 Data and empirical strategy
3.1 Data
3.1.1 GAUL data on border changes
Our data on border reforms stems from the GAUL project. This dataset provides annual shapefiles of
subnational administrative boundaries across the globe. The main objectives of the GAUL project are to
provide reliable spatial information on administrative units and to maintain a historical record of changes
that occur to their shapes and extent (GAUL, 2014). Using various official sources, this project indicates
subnational boundaries as line features in publicly available shapefiles.
The emergence or dissolving of a line from one to the next year ostensibly implies some form of border
reform. We use ArcGIS to systematically track changes to the line features that represent the borders
of the first-level subnational units. Line features can change in two ways. First, a line can emerge that
crosses through an existing region. We classify these changes as splits. Second, an existing line between
two regions may vanish. We classify these types of border changes as mergers. The categorizations
of line feature changes as splits and mergers encompasses in particular two distinct types of border
reforms. First, the emergence of a new line may be a generic split of a region into two (or more) regions.
Second, the ceding of territory of one region to another already existing region would be classified by
our algorithmic procedure as a split from the perspective of the ceding region. From the perspective of
the receiving region, this border change would be classified as a merger (as an existing line vanishes).
For an illustration, consider Figure 1. Subfigure (a) overlays the regional boundaries across Africa
in 1992 over the boundaries in 2013. The borders in 1992 are colored green while those in 2013 are
20Exceptions are those cases where splits are intended to diminish the administrative coherence of minorities.
21Anecdotal evidence indicates that demands for splits are indeed drivers of violent conflicts. In Ethiopia, for example,
recent protests in the Amhara region can be traced back to demands by ethnic Amharas that their land is shifted from the Tigray
region to the Amhara region; see http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36940906 and http://www.africanews.
com/2016/08/02/the-powerful-vs-the-populous-the-boundary-crisis-behind-ethiopia-s-protest//.
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colored blue (we indicate country borders with black lines). The observable blue lines hence indicate
new borders that emerged over the sample period and thereby allow us to identify all splits from 1992 to
2013. Subfigure (b) overlays the regional boundaries in 2013 over those in 1992. In this case, the borders
as of 1992 are colored blue and those in 2013 green. Therefore, the blue lines show those borders that
vanished over the sample period and hence indicate mergers.
Since we have annual data, we can identify the year in which a particular region was split or merged.
After identifying such changes to the line features, we project the emerging (in case of splits) or vanish-
ing (in case of mergers) line to a 1 × 1 degree (about 110km × 110km) grid of pixels covering all of the
African continent. As discussed above, unlike regions the 1× 1 degree pixels can serve as time-constant
units of analysis.
Based on the projection of the border changes to the grid of pixels, we classify pixels as being subject
to a split or a merger in a given year. Consider subfigure (a) of Figure 4 which shows how Africa is
divided into the 1 × 1 degree pixels. Pixels are colored depending on whether they were subject to
splits or mergers over the sample period. As suggested by our discussion in Section 2, and in line with
Figure 1, we observe that more pixels were subject to splits than mergers. There is also a large number
of pixels where the corresponding territory underwent both at least one split and one merger over the
sample period.
3.1.2 Luminosity as proxy for economic development
Following previous literature, we use night light data as a proxy for development at low levels of geog-
raphy (Alesina et al., 2016; Hodler and Raschky, 2014; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016). This
data is based on images of the earth at night obtained by satellites of the US Air Force (USAF) Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program Operational Linescan System (DMSP-OLS). The original imagery is
processed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA) and released to the public as
raster datasets.
The raster datasets consist of annual average stable night lights between 8.30pm to 10pm and are
available at a resolution of 30 arc-seconds (about 0.86 square kilometer at the equator) for all years after
1992. Each pixel of the dataset stores a digital value ranging from 0 to 63 indicating the amount of
average light of an area covering 30 arc-seconds. Higher values imply that a pixel emanates more light
(Henderson et al., 2012).
To obtain a proxy for pixel-level GDP, we overlay the grid of pixels over the raster datasets and cal-
culate the sum of the digital values of each cell with size 30 arc-seconds that falls within the boundaries
of each of the 1 × 1 degree pixel as shown in subfigure (a) of Figure 4. Subfigure (b) plots average
night lights over the sample period in each of these pixels. More strongly shaded pixels indicate higher
luminosity. In general, the pattern of pixel-level luminosity matches with common views of African
development. For example, coastal areas tend to have higher luminosity than the hinterland.
3.1.3 Afrobarometer data
To study how political attitudes and perceptions of service quality evolve after border changes, we rely
on data from the Afrobarometer surveys. The Afrobarometer surveys are an “independent, nonpartisan
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research project that measures the social, political, and economic atmosphere in Africa”.22 There are
currently six waves of the survey, with a varying coverage of countries across waves. Later waves have
generally a better coverage (the first wave covers 12 countries while the sixth wave covers 36 countries).
The overall sample size increased throughout the first six waves, from about 21,000 to about 54,000
respondents.
For the surveys, interviewers conduct face-to-face interviews with representative samples of respon-
dents in each wave and country (1,200 or 2,400 respondents, respectively) and ask several questions
about their personal circumstances as well as their attitudes toward the current political climate. To
explore the effect of border changes on political attitudes, we focus on responses regarding interest in
politics and trust in the executive of the central government (president or prime minister). In addition,
we exploit information on support of democracy, satisfaction with democracy and understanding of gov-
ernment. For service quality, we rely on responses for questions regarding access to health as well as
water and food security.23
The wording of the questions is not identical across waves, but the meaning is similar. Specifically, to
measure effects on political attitudes, we use responses to questions with the following content:
• Trust in president: How much do you trust the president?
• Support democracy: Is democracy preferable to any other kind of government?
• Satisfied democracy: How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in your country?
• Understand government: Politics and government sometimes seem so complicated that you
can’t really understand what’s going on. Do you agree?
• Interest in politics: How interested are you in public affairs?
Responses are on an ordinal scale. We thus transform the data into binary variables to make them
comparable across survey waves. If the relevant dummy variable assumes 1, then this implies higher
interest in politics, more trust in the president, more support and satisfaction of democracy as well as a
higher understanding of government.
To study the implications of border changes on service delivery, we use the following questions:
• Without healthcare In the past twelve months, how often have you or your family: gone without
medicine or medical treatment that you needed?
• Without water In the past twelve months, how often have you or your family: gone without
enough clean water to drink and cook with?
• Without food: In the last twelve months, how often have you or your family: gone without
enough food to eat?
22See http://afrobarometer.org/.
23There are further questions covered in some waves that may be related to border changes. Unfortunately, they are not
asked in a sufficient number of waves to be useful for our analysis below.
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We focus on these outcomes as they are crucial determinants of citizens’ welfare. Access to health
care as well as food and water security are pressing issues across large parts of Africa and many de-
centralization reforms across the continent were specifically intended to improve the delivery of these
services (Desai and McGregor, 2011; Babu, 1999; Kaseje, 2006).
As before, responses are on an ordinal scale, which we convert into binary variables which are 1 if
respondents state that they went at least several times without these public services. We then project
this data on the grid of pixels. This is possible because the Afrobarometer data is geocoded in the
sense that we know the district of a respondent. We can hence match each respondent’s district to each
pixel and thereby construct a pixel-level panel (covering varying individuals within pixels).24 Since the
Afrobarometer has been started only around 2000, the covered period is 2000-2013.25 Consequently, the
number of time periods for which we can explore how border changes affect political attitudes as well as
assessments of service quality is smaller than for the night lights regressions. On the other hand, border
changes may affect political attitudes and service quality more quickly than economic development,
which is a more aggregate measure. In any case, we have for all considered outcomes data from at least
3 waves. For most outcomes, we have data from 6 waves.
3.1.4 Conflict data
We use geocoded data on conflict events from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
(ACLED) to explore how border changes affect the incidence of conflicts. This dataset collects, inter
alia, information on the location and date of reported conflict events, e. g. violence committed by gov-
ernment forces, rebels, etc. The data covers all countries in Africa over the period 1997-2014. We use
the information on violent conflicts (with fatalities) and project these conflict events on the 1× 1 degree
grid.
3.1.5 Data for ethnic fractionalization
To measure ethnic fractionalization, we rely on a shapefile provided by the Geo-Referencing of Ethnic
Groups (GREG) project. This project uses maps and data from the Soviet Atlas Narodov Mira to geo-
reference ethnic groups across the globe, including Africa. We project the ethnic groups boundaries
on the grid of pixels and count the number of groups that fall within a pixel to construct a measure of
pixel-level ethnic heterogeneity.26
24Specifically, we obtain “characteristic” geocodes for each districts by using a Google Maps algorithm and then use these
geocodes to match Afrobarometer respondents to the 1 × 1 degree pixels.
25Note that the sixth wave of Afrobarometer covers 2016. To maximize sample size, we include observations from this
wave even though our border changes data only lasts until 2013.
26Note that GREG denotes up to three major ethnic groups in each settlement area. We count all mentioned groups for our
heterogeneity measure. Moreover, GREG measures the spatial location of ethnicities prior to our sample period. Hence, the
numbers reflect values before the start of our sample period and accordingly, are not affected by the various border reforms
during the time-frame of the analysis.
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3.1.6 Data on subnational elections
To measure subnational autonomy, we hand-collect for each country data on whether it had any type of
subnational election during our sample period. The idea is that the existence of subnational elections
likely suggests some degree of regional political independence. Typically, subnational elections, if they
take place, are held for legislative bodies and/or the regional executive. Table A.1 in the online appendix
lists which countries held subnational elections, together with the years in which the elections took place.
3.1.7 Data for covariates
We use geographically disaggregated data on total population, forest cover, urban land area, the age and
gender ratios as controls in some specifications. This data is obtained from various sources.
Data on total population is from the Gridded Population of the World Version 4 dataset, which relies
on population census to model local population at a resolution of 30 arc-seconds. This data is available
in five-year increments starting in 2000. As for the luminosity data, we overlay the grid of pixels over
the raster datasets and calculate the sum of the digital values of each cell of 30 arc-seconds that falls
within the boundaries of a given 1 × 1 pixel. Since we have no annual data for population, we replace
missing population data with the information from the last available year (i. e. the value of a pixel in
2009 is the same as its value in 2005). For years before 2000, i. e. the first year with available data, we
use the value in 2000.
Information on forest cover is from the MODIS Percentage Forest Cover Fraction dataset. This data
is based on satellite imagery of the fraction of an area covered by trees or forests by the MODIS Sensor
(Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer). The data is available at a resolution of 250 meter
grid cells and for all years between 2001-2010 from the US Geological Survey and Integrated Climate
Data Center. As for the population data, we aggregate the forest cover data to the level of 1 × 1 grid
cells and replace missing values before 2001 with the value in 2001 and after 2010 with value in 2010.
Disaggregated data on the demographic and gender composition of African regions is taken from
the United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects (2015 Revision). This dataset is
mainly based on detailed official subnational data and is available for 5-year age groupings, both for
male and female at a resolution of about 0.01 × 0.01 decimal degrees (about 1km × 1km) for 2000 and
2005. As before, we aggregate this 0.01 × 0.01 pixels to our 1 × 1 degree pixels and replace missing
years with the closest available values.
Data on land cover is obtained from the MODIS land surface type dataset from the US Geological
Survey and Integrated Climate Data Center. The data measures the land area fraction by land use type
at a resolution of 0.5 × 0.5 decimal degrees for each year in 2001 to 2012. We use the fraction of urban
or developed land as a measure of urbanized land area. Again, we aggregate the urban land area to the
level of 1 × 1 degree pixels for later analysis.
3.2 Empirical strategy
To estimate the causal effect of border changes on local development, we implement a difference-in-
difference design using the 1 × 1 degree pixels as units of observations. The basic specification is:
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yi,t = αi+ γt +βsSpliti,t +βmMergeri,t + εi,t , (1)
where yi,t is log of aggregate night light output in pixel i in year t.27 Spliti,t is a dummy that is one for
all T ≤ t ≤ 2013 after a new feature line in the GAUL files emerged in T within the territory covered by
a particular pixel (i. e. from the first split by which a pixel is affected until the end of the sample period).
Similarly, Mergeri,t is a dummy variable that is 1 for all T ≤ t ≤ 2013 after a feature line vanished within
the territory covered by a pixel.28
To account for year-specific effects, we include year fixed effects γt . Year fixed effects also account
for annual variations in measured night light output due to different calibrations of the satellites used to
record luminosity. To control for systematic (but time-invariant) differences between treated and control
pixels, we include pixel fixed effects. For hypothesis tests, we rely on heteroscedasticity-robust standard
errors that are clustered at the level of the pixels.
As always with difference-in-difference designs, the identifying assumption is that treated and control
pixels would have had common trends in the absence of treatment. This identifying assumption is
particularly important in our context as border changes do not take place randomly. To explore the
robustness of our results to possible violations of the common trends assumption, we control for a
number of time-varying pixel-level variables in robustness tests. We also report results from event-
study regressions where we can observe whether there are any differences in how light output evolves
immediately before a particular border change takes place, i.e. we verify the common trend assumption.
4 Results
4.1 Baseline
4.1.1 Main results
Table 2 collects the baseline results where we relate border changes to night light output. We observe
a positive and significant coefficient for both splits and mergers across all specifications, indicating
that pixels that were affected by either type of border change experience an improvement in economic
conditions, compared to unaffected pixels. More specifically, the results indicate that night light output
is on average about 13% higher after splits and 42% higher after mergers. Using the elasticity between
night-lights and GDP of 0.3 estimated by Henderson et al. (2012), these results imply that splits cause
an increase of GDP by 3.9% while mergers cause an increase of 12.6%.
While plausible when viewed in isolation, it may appear paradoxical that both splits and mergers
have a positive effect on development. As we show below, an explanation for this apparent paradox
is that splits and mergers work through different transmission channels. However, before exploring
transmission channels, we first establish the robustness of the baseline estimates.
27For pixels that have a value of 0 for aggregate night light output, we add 1 before taking the log.
28Note that by this definition of the treatment dummies, we implicitly account for the (few) pixels affected by border
changes in two separate years.
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4.1.2 Robustness
Time-varying covariates. To establish the robustness of the previous results, we replicate the baseline
specification after controlling for various time-varying covariates at the pixel-level: population, forest
cover, the share of a pixel that is urbanized, the share of young among the total population (age < 25
years), the share of old (age > 65), and the gender ratio (number of women / men).29
Table 3 collects the results. The share of urban area is the only variable that shows a significant corre-
lation with night light output: as pixels become more urbanized, night light output increases. However,
the estimates for splits and mergers remain virtually unchanged.
Omitting countries. Next, we study whether the results are dependent on the inclusion of one specific
country. It would be reassuring to confirm that our results are not driven by only a few outliers. We
therefore estimate 48 versions of model (3) in Table 2 after omitting, in turn, all pixels that fall within a
given country.30 The results are collected in Figure 5, where we plot for splits (Subfigure a) and mergers
(Subfigure b) 48 coefficient estimates and 90% confidence intervals. Each estimate notes the country
that was dropped.
We observe that the statistical significance of splits is dependent in particular on the inclusion of
Sudan. While the estimated coefficient is still positive, it turns insignificant once Sudan is dropped. The
importance of Sudan for the estimated coefficient is likely driven by the fact that many splits took place
in this country during the sample period. These splits ostensibly had a positive effect on development.31
Accordingly, these results indicate that the average treatment effect of splits is fragile and depends on the
sample of countries that are included in the analysis. We explore the fragility of the average treatment
effect of splits in more detail below and show that splits have large and thus arguably more robust effects
in specific circumstances, i. e. in contexts with high ethnic fragmentation.
For mergers, we find that while the omission of Sudan and Ethiopia reduces the coefficient estimates,
they remain comfortably significant. Dropping South Africa, on the other hand, leads to a higher esti-
mate. Overall, the estimates for mergers are generally robust to the omission of individual countries.
Country-specific year effects. While the baseline regressions include year fixed effects and hence
control for continent-wide common shocks, it is possible that countries that implemented border reforms
were from the outset on different economic trajectories than countries that did not change their territorial
structure. Consequently, the common trends assumptions may be violated in our baseline regressions.
To test for this, we re-estimate Equation 1 while including country-specific rather than continent-wide
year fixed effects, i.e. holding institutional and economic changes at the country-level constant. We
hence identify the effect of border changes by within-country variation. The identifying assumption
is that pixels which were not affected by a border change were on the same economic trajectory than
29We include all variables in logs.
30 We assign pixels that are cut by country borders to the country where most of the area of the pixel is located.
31South Sudan became an independent country in 2011, i. e. at the end of the sample period. We treat South Sudan as part
of Sudan in the last three years of our sample for the sake of simplicity.
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treated pixels within the same country. As before, we assign pixels to countries, allocating pixels that
are cut by country borders to that country that encompasses the largest fraction of a pixel.
The results are collected in Table 4. The estimated coefficients are similar to the baseline results,
suggesting that the common trends assumption is reasonable in our context. While this specification
does not rule out the possibility that control pixels within the same country were on a different economic
trajectory than treated pixels, this is less less likely than different trends across countries that did and did
not implement border reforms.
Different grid sizes. We now explore whether the results are an artifact of our choice of grid size.
First, rather than using a 1 × 1 degree grid, we re-estimate the baseline model after plotting the border
change and night lights data to 0.5 × 0.5 degree pixels (about 55km × 55 km). Second, we use regions
in their boundaries as of 1992 as time-constant units of analysis. That is, we project border changes in
the 1992-2013 period to regional boundaries as of 1992 and use those boundaries as time-constant units
of analysis (ignoring the fact that regions which were later affected by a border reform would cease to
exist). To compare the granularity of these alternative units of analysis, consider first the total number
of pixels per grid (see also Figure 6). The total number of pixels in the 1 × 1 grid is 2758, while it is
10,652 for the 0.5 × 0.5 grid. Similarly, the number of regions in 1992 was 685.
The results are collected in Table 5. As can be seen from Panel A, halving the pixel size does not
change the estimates qualitatively: both splits and merges continue to have a significantly positive effect
on night lights. The results are also quantitatively similar, with splits having a slightly larger effect on
luminosity than in the baseline regressions. These results suggest that the effects of border changes can
be identified at a highly disaggregated level of geography.
Panel B reports the results on the level of the 1992 regions. The results show that the estimate for splits
are insignificant, again pointing to the fragility of the average treatment effect of splits. The estimates
for mergers, on the other hand, remain both statistically significant and numerically large.
4.2 Event-studies
In this section, we report results from event-study regressions. The main purpose of these specifications
is to asses how quickly the economic benefits of border changes emerge, and thus to gain a more com-
prehensive picture of how border changes affect economic development. In addition, event studies can
help us to evaluate the common trends assumption further.
We hence estimate models of the following form:
yi,t =αi+ γt +β<−5Border changei,t<−5 +
−1
∑
t=−5
βtBorder changei,t
+
5
∑
t=1
βtBorder changei,t +βt>5Border changei,t>5 + εi,t ,
(2)
with Border change ∈ {Split,Merger} and t = −1 as the base year. That is, we explore luminosity in
treated pixels in all years before and after a border change relative to luminosity in the year immediately
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before the border change. For the first four years before the base year and the first five years after the
border change, we provide annual estimates. For the remaining years, we estimate an average effect over
all remaining years.
We collect the results for splits in subfigure (a) of Figure 7. While some of the event dummies
are significant for the pre-treatment period, there is no obvious trend, suggesting that there were no
systematic differences in the economic trajectories of pixels affected and not affected by splits. After a
split takes place, we observe no change in night lights for the first five years. Only after five years, the
effect turns significantly positive.
Subfigure (b) reports the results for mergers. As for splits, we observe similar pre-treatment trends
in the treated and control pixels.32 After a merger, the positive effects accumulate over time. We begin
to observe a significant positive effect from year three onwards. After five years, luminosity is about
50% higher in treated pixels compared to the control pixels. Overall, these results confirm the previous
findings. Mergers have a quick yet persistent effect on night lights while the effects of splits are more
muted.
5 Mechanisms
The above results suggest that the subnational border changes observed in Africa, and in particular
mergers, had on average a positive effect. Since these estimates are average treatment effects on the
treated, one conclusion that follows is that those regions which were affected by border changes were
in general not of optimal size. Changing their size and shape led to improvements, both in the case of
mergers and, to a lesser extent, in the case of splits.
It is, however, intriguing that the estimates for splits and mergers are of significantly different mag-
nitudes.33 This points to different channels through which splits and mergers affect development. In
the following, we focus on two specific channels. First, border changes may increase administrative
efficiency. Splits may increase efficiency if they make it easier for public officials to tap into local
knowledge and to better tailor policies to heterogeneous populations. Mergers may increase efficiency
if they lead to a reduction in administrative overhead and enable public officials to exploit economies of
scale in the provision of public services.
The second channel works through increased political stability. As discussed, one apparent short-
coming of the border design in Africa is that ethnic groups can be either arbitrarily split by borders or
lumped together with other and dissimilar groups into a single administrative unit. Splits and mergers
may hence lead to a better match of the historical settlement areas of the different groups and the admin-
istrative borders, thereby improving political stability and reducing conflicts. This increase in political
stability may then have positive effects for development. We explore these questions in detail below.
32 While we observe that the event dummy is statistically significant 3 years before mergers, there is no systematic trend in
the pre-treatment period.
33Conducting t-tests for the baseline estimates for both mergers and splits yield a significant difference at the 1% level.
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5.1 The role of ethnic fractionalization
If improved political stability is a relevant channel, we should expect that the economic effects of ad-
ministrative border changes depend on whether they have changed the degree of regional ethnic frac-
tionalization. If border changes increase ethnic homogeneity, i. e. align with the historical settlement
areas of ethnic groups, regional ethnic fractionalization should be reduced. On the other hand, if splits
take place in ethnically homogeneous regions or mergers happen between heterogeneous regions, then
regional fractionalization should increase. In this subsection, we study whether more heterogeneous or
more homogeneous pixels experience a stronger effect on night lights after a border reform. The idea is
that if splits or mergers affect luminosity through an improvement in political stability, we should ob-
serve stronger effects for splits in pixels that are heterogeneous (since the new borders are presumably
drawn in a way to divide two disparate groups) and for mergers in pixels that are homogeneous (since
the vanishing borders used to divide one homogeneous group into different regions).
Table 6 expands the baseline specification with interaction effects between mergers and splits and
different measures of ethnic fractionalization. In Panel A, we rely on a binary definition of ethnic
fractionalization. We define pixels that are inhabited by only one ethnic group as defined by the GREG
shapefile as homogeneous and all other pixels as heterogeneous. In Panel B, we construct a count
variable to measure ethnic fractionalization by counting the number of distinct ethnic groups in a pixel.
We find that ethnically heterogeneous pixels experience a strong increase in night lights after a split.
In Panel A, the estimated coefficient for splits is positive and highly significant for heterogeneous pixels
but insignificant with a negative sign for homogeneous pixels. In Panel B, the interaction term between
splits and the number of ethnic groups is significantly positive. Accordingly, we conjecture that splits
lead to higher growth if they reduce regional ethnic fragmentation.
For mergers, we find no significant differences between homogeneous and heterogeneous pixels. That
is, while the interaction effect in Panel A is only significantly different from zero in heterogeneous pixels,
t-tests show no significant difference between the two interaction effects for mergers. The apparent
irrelevance of ethnic heterogeneity for mergers is further confirmed in Panel B, where the interaction
between the merger dummy and the number of groups is insignificant.
Overall, these results indicate that the weak positive effects of splits found in the baseline regres-
sions comes at least in part from a reduction of political instability in ethnically heterogeneous regions.
For mergers, on the other hand, this channel appears to be unimportant, arguably because subnational
mergers in Africa were implemented for reasons other than to improve political stability.
5.2 Border changes and conflict
To buttress the above interpretation, we next explore whether border changes affect the incidence of
conflicts. For this, we relate the treatment dummies for splits and mergers to conflict events. First,
we estimate the average effects of either mergers and splits on conflict incidence. Second, we estimate
interaction models where we interact the dummies for splits and mergers with the dummy for whether a
pixel has more than one ethnicity (i. e. the binary measure of ethnic fractionalization).
The average effects of border reforms of either type on the incidence of armed conflicts are collected
in Table 7. Splits result in about 17% fewer conflicts, while mergers have no significant effect. Second,
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we study whether the effect of border changes depends on the degree of ethnic fractionalization in a
pixel. Border changes should have a stronger effect on political stability and conflicts in more frag-
mented regions. We collect the results in Table 8. Splits have no effect on the incidence of conflicts in
homogeneous regions. In heterogeneous regions, on the other hand, they have a significantly negative
effect.
These results reaffirm that one channel through which splits affect development is a pacification of
conflicts in ethnically diverse regions. They also suggest that this channel is not relevant for mergers,
again because mergers are presumably intended to achieve other goals than political stability.
5.3 Subnational elections
To investigate the link between the specific institutional context and border changes further, we next
study whether splits and mergers are more effective when they are implemented in countries where
subnational units have significant autonomy. It is plausible that subnational autonomy is a necessary
precondition for border changes to pacify (ethnic) conflicts. If a new region is created through a split or
merger, but its policies as well as the chief administrators are still determined at the center, the border
change may be merely symbolic and hence have no substantive consequences.
Panel A of Table 9 reports regressions where we interact the border change dummy with a dummy
for whether in a given year the country into which (the largest share of) a pixel falls has any type of
subnational elections, which we interpret as a proxy for subnational (political) autonomy.
The results indicate that splits are only effective in increasing growth if they take place in countries
with subnational elections. For mergers, on the other hand, we again find no interactions with the
existence of subnational elections.
These findings indicate that the main channel through which splits affect growth is the mitigation of
(ethnic) conflicts. Giving marginalized ethnicities their own regions will only mitigate conflicts if the
regions have meaningful political autonomy. This is confirmed by Panel B of Table 9, where we find
only a significantly negative effect of splits on conflicts for countries that have subnational elections.
For mergers, the existence of subnational elections appears to be unrelated to the incidence of conflicts.
5.4 Political attitudes
If splits affect economic development through a reduction in conflicts, we should observe a correspond-
ing change in political attitudes in the affected regions. In particular, inhabitants should be more likely
to be satisfied with the political system. It is also possible that mergers, even if they do not lead to more
conflicts, affect political attitudes. Notably, studies of municipal mergers in industrialized countries
indicate citizens become disenchanted with the political process if they are forced into larger political
units. These effects are especially likely if the growth effect found for mergers is due to cuts in public
services and cost savings rather than increased administrative efficiency.
To explore these questions, we use Afrobarometer survey data, which we match to our pixel-level
border change data. We then estimate different variants of the following model:
dn,i,t = αi+ γt +βsSpliti,t +βmMergeri,t ++εi,t , (3)
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where dn,i,t are our re-coded variables that record the response of an individual n residing in pixel i in
year t to one of the five questions on political attitudes discussed in Section 3.1.3. In all regressions we
control for pixel-fixed effects αi and year fixed effects γt34, respectively.
The results are collected in Table 10. We find that splits have strong and statistically significant
effects on political attitudes. Respondents that were subject to splits show an increase in their trust in
the president and display both higher support and satisfaction with democracy. Hence, splits ostensibly
increase the satisfaction with the political system. Respondents also voice a lower interest in politics,
which we interpret as evidence that potentially divisive conflicts are pacified.
For mergers, we find no effects on political attitudes. However, respondents are less likely to state
that they understand how government works. This indicates that mergers move government further
away from citizens and makes it less accessible to them. This does, however, not necessarily imply that
mergers lead to a decline in public services, especially since we do not observe a lower satisfaction with
the political processes or any other negative effects on political attitudes.
5.5 Service delivery
A related channel through which border changes may be related to development is the provision of
key public services, notably healthcare or water and food security. How such services evolve in the
wake of border changes is closely linked to the mechanisms through which they affect development.
Improvements in key services may lead to more political stability and satisfaction with the government,
but they also tie up scarce public services that could be allocated into areas that have more immediate
or potentially larger effects on growth, e .g. physical infrastructure such as roads or telecommunications
networks.
To explore this issue, we relate the border change dummies to the self-reported indicators of public
service provision from the Afrobarometer described in Section 3.1.3: whether a respondent did not
receive adequate health care, whether she had to go without sufficient water, and whether she had to go
without food. The empirical specification follows Equation 3.
The results are collected in Table 11. We find that splits ostensibly lead to an improvement in service
delivery. Respondents in pixels that were affected by a split report a significantly lower likelihood of not
receiving basic public services. Accordingly, splits seem to be associated with higher public spending on
services, which may be one reason why their effect on luminosity is noticeably smaller than that of merg-
ers. While it is conceivable that splits lead to higher public services because, as discussed above, they
increase administrative efficiency (rather than higher public spending) and allow for a better targeting
of public resources, this seems unlikely since they by definition involve a duplication of administrative
units and hence higher costs. The fact that they mitigate political conflicts also indicates public services
increase because the new units allocate additional resources to previously disenfranchised groups rather
than using a fixed amount of resources more efficiently.
For mergers, we find no effect on health services and on water supply. We only find a beneficial effect
on food supply. Our interpretation of these results is that mergers reduce administrative overhead and
34Year fixed effects are preferable to survey wave fixed effects since a wave captures a broader period of time (usually 2 to
3 years).
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increase efficiency since they appear to lead to more luminosity while keeping public services largely
constant. That is, we observe no cuts and only improvements for one of the three outcomes we explore.
5.6 Bureaucratic efficiency
In this section, we study the link between administrative efficiency and border changes further. If merg-
ers lead to higher luminosity primarily because they imply higher administrative efficiency, then their
effect should be more pronounced in countries that have a more competent bureaucracy. These countries
should be most equipped to fully reap the economies of scale that may come with mergers.
We explore this issue by estimating interaction models of the following form:
yi,t = αi+ γt +∑
k
βkBorder changei,t ×Bureaucratic qualityk,t + εi,t , (4)
where Bureaucratic qualityk,t measures the country-level bureaucratic quality. As discussed, we ob-
tain country-level information on government effectiveness as measured by bureaucratic quality from the
International Political Risk Guide. Specifically, we use the composite score of government effectiveness
which is normalized to values between 0 and 1.
Table 12 collects the results. In the most complete specification (Model 3), we find that mergers are
significantly more effective in raising economic activity in countries with higher bureaucratic quality.
This is consistent with the interpretation that one important channel through which mergers affect lumi-
nosity is administrative efficiency. While we find that splits also have a stronger effect in countries with
better bureaucracies, the effect is not robust once we control for the effect of mergers.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the economic consequences of subnational border changes in Africa. Tracking
all state-level border changes during 1992-2013 in all of Africa, we find that regions that were affected
by mergers and splits experience stronger economic development as measured by nighttime luminosity.
The effect of mergers is larger and more robust than that of splits, indicating that these two types of
border reforms work through different channels. Indeed, we find suggestive evidence that splits increase
political stability and reduce conflicts, possibly by leading to a more comprehensive provision of public
services and more benign political attitudes by the affected inhabitants. We find no effects of mergers
on political attitudes or conflicts, but we also observe no decline in public service delivery. While only
circumstantial, this evidence is consistent with the interpretation that mergers have a positive effect on
development because they increase administrative efficiency. Splits appear to be implemented rather for
political than for economic reasons and as a consequence have only second-order, albeit still positive,
effects on economic growth.
Overall, these results suggest that the present shape of subnational borders in Africa, just as pre-
sumably those of national borders, is inefficient. If African countries want to improve economic perfor-
mance, they should consider merging regional units. These types of reforms may increase administrative
efficiency and thereby improve economic performance. If the main aim is to reduce ethnic conflicts and
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foster political stability (i. e. more benign political attitudes and fewer conflicts with fatalities), splits
seem to be an effective strategy. As an added benefit, the improvement in political stability may also
offer a growth dividend in the long-run.
Our subnational results have also implications for the national level. Secessions from nation states are
clearly more difficult than subnational territorial reorganizations and arguably involve many unmanage-
able risks. However, supranational integration, the equivalent of mergers at the subnational level, may be
a feasible way forward. Indeed, small steps towards regional integration have already been taken on the
continent with the emergence of organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) or the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) (Hartzenberg, 2011). Our
results would imply that such efforts should continue.
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Figure 2: Number of first-level regions in Africa, 1992-2013.
0
1
2
3
4
5
C
ou
nt
rie
s
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
Splits Mergers
Figure 3: Number of countries with border changes in Africa, 1992-2013.
28
Leg
end No
 bo
rde
r ch
ang
e
Onl
y sp
lit
Onl
y m
erg
er
Bot
h
(a
)
B
O
R
D
E
R
C
H
A
N
G
E
S
Leg
end
Ave
rag
e ni
ght
 ligh
ts, 1
992
-201
3
0 - 
100
100
 - 5
00
500
 - 1
000
100
0 - 
200
0
200
0 - 
500
0
500
0 - 
100
00
100
00 
- 50
000
0
(b
)
N
IG
H
T
L
IG
H
T
O
U
T
P
U
T
Fi
gu
re
4:
B
or
de
rc
ha
ng
es
an
d
lig
ht
ou
tp
ut
at
th
e
pi
xe
l-
le
ve
l.
Su
bfi
gu
re
(a
)s
ho
w
s
th
e
pi
xe
ls
af
fe
ct
ed
by
a
sp
lit
,m
er
ge
r,
or
bo
th
du
ri
ng
th
e
sa
m
pl
e
pe
ri
od
.S
ub
fig
ur
e
(b
)s
ho
w
s
av
er
ag
e
ni
gh
t
lig
ht
ou
tp
ut
of
ea
ch
pi
xe
ls
ov
er
th
e
sa
m
pl
e
pe
ri
od
.
A
lg
er
ia
A
ng
ol
a
B
en
in
B
ot
sw
an
a
B
ur
ki
na
 F
as
o
B
ur
un
di
C
am
er
oo
n
C
en
tra
l A
fri
ca
n 
R
ep
ub
lic
C
ha
d
C
on
go
C
ot
e 
d'
Iv
oi
re
D
R
C
 C
on
go
E
qu
at
or
ia
l G
ui
ne
a
E
rit
re
a
E
th
io
pi
a
G
ab
on
G
am
bi
a
G
ha
na
G
ui
ne
a-
B
is
sa
u
G
ui
ne
a
K
en
ya
Le
so
th
o
Li
be
ria
Li
by
a
M
ad
ag
as
ca
r
M
al
aw
i
M
al
i
M
au
rit
an
ia
M
or
oc
co
M
oz
am
bi
qu
e
N
am
ib
ia
N
ig
er
N
ig
er
ia
R
w
an
da
S
en
eg
al
S
ie
rr
a 
Le
on
e
S
om
al
ia
S
ou
th
 A
fri
ca
S
w
az
ila
nd
To
go
Tu
ni
si
a
U
ga
nd
a
Ta
nz
an
ia
W
es
te
rn
 S
ah
ar
a
Za
m
bi
a
Zi
m
ba
bw
e
S
ud
an
E
gy
pt
-.3
0
.3
.6
.9
1.
2
E
st
im
at
e
Country
Coefficent 90% CI
(a) SPLITS
A
lg
er
ia
A
ng
ol
a
B
en
in
B
ot
sw
an
a
B
ur
ki
na
 F
as
o
B
ur
un
di
C
am
er
oo
n
C
en
tra
l A
fri
ca
n 
R
ep
ub
lic
C
ha
d
C
on
go
C
ot
e 
d'
Iv
oi
re
D
R
C
 C
on
go
E
qu
at
or
ia
l G
ui
ne
a
E
rit
re
a
E
th
io
pi
a
G
ab
on
G
am
bi
a
G
ha
na
G
ui
ne
a-
B
is
sa
u
G
ui
ne
a
K
en
ya
Le
so
th
o
Li
be
ria
Li
by
a
M
ad
ag
as
ca
r
M
al
aw
i
M
al
i
M
au
rit
an
ia
M
or
oc
co
M
oz
am
bi
qu
e
N
am
ib
ia
N
ig
er
N
ig
er
ia
R
w
an
da
S
en
eg
al
S
ie
rr
a 
Le
on
e
S
om
al
ia
S
ou
th
 A
fri
ca
S
w
az
ila
nd
To
go
Tu
ni
si
a
U
ga
nd
a
Ta
nz
an
ia
W
es
te
rn
 S
ah
ar
a
Za
m
bi
a
Zi
m
ba
bw
e
S
ud
an
E
gy
pt
-.3
0
.3
.6
.9
1.
2
1.
5
E
st
im
at
e
Country
Coefficent 90% CI
(b) MERGERS
Figure 5: Robustness test: Omission of countries form sample.
Leg
end No
 bo
rde
r ch
ang
e
Onl
y sp
lit
Onl
y m
erg
er
Bot
h
(a
)
0.
5
×
0.
5
D
E
G
R
E
E
S
(b
)
19
92
R
E
G
IO
N
-L
E
V
E
L
Fi
gu
re
6:
D
iff
er
en
tp
ix
el
si
ze
s
an
d
bo
rd
er
ch
an
ge
s.
Su
bfi
gu
re
(a
)
sh
ow
s
bo
rd
er
ch
an
ge
s
at
th
e
pi
xe
ls
iz
e
of
0.
5
×
0.
5
de
gr
ee
s.
Su
bfi
gu
re
(b
)
sh
ow
s
bo
rd
er
ch
an
ge
s
at
a
pi
xe
ls
iz
e
of
19
92
re
gi
on
s.
-1
-.5
0
.5
1
E
st
im
at
e
<-5 -5 -4 -3 -2 0 1 2 3 4 5 >5
Year before/after split
Coefficent 90% CI
(a) SPLITS
-1
-.5
0
.5
1
E
st
im
at
e
<-5 -5 -4 -3 -2 0 1 2 3 4 5 >5
Year before/after merger
Coefficent 90% CI
(b) MERGERS
Figure 7: Event-study of splits and mergers around a 5-year window. This figure shows event study plots at the
pixel-level for splits and mergers covering the first five pre-border change and the first five post-border change years. The
baseline level of night lights is the one in the year before the border change.
Ta
bl
e
1:
B
O
R
D
E
R
C
H
A
N
G
E
S
IN
A
F
R
IC
A
Y
ea
r
Sp
lit
s
M
er
ge
rs
19
94
E
th
io
pi
a;
So
ut
hA
fr
ic
a;
Su
da
n
E
th
io
pi
a;
So
ut
hA
fr
ic
a
19
95
C
on
go
19
96
G
ui
ne
a
19
97
C
oˆt
ed
’I
vo
ir
e;
D
R
C
C
on
go
;
M
or
oc
co
;
N
ig
er
ia
;
Z
im
-
ba
bw
e
C
oˆt
ed
’I
vo
ir
e;
M
or
oc
co
;N
ig
er
ia
19
98
B
ur
un
di
;E
th
io
pi
a
19
99
B
en
in
20
00
C
ha
d;
C
oˆt
ed
’I
vo
ir
e;
L
ib
er
ia
;S
ud
an
C
ha
d
20
01
C
oˆt
ed
’I
vo
ir
e;
L
ib
er
ia
B
ur
ki
na
Fa
so
20
02
C
on
go
;S
en
eg
al
;T
an
za
ni
a
Se
ne
ga
l
20
03
C
on
go
G
am
bi
a
20
05
So
ut
hA
fr
ic
a;
U
ga
nd
a
So
ut
hA
fr
ic
a
20
06
R
w
an
da
;S
ud
an
;U
ga
nd
a
R
w
an
da
20
07
U
ga
nd
a
20
08
Se
ne
ga
l
20
09
E
gy
pt
;U
ga
nd
a
20
10
U
ga
nd
a
U
ga
nd
a
20
11
C
on
go
;S
ud
an
20
12
C
oˆt
ed
’I
vo
ir
e;
Ta
nz
an
ia
C
oˆt
ed
’I
vo
ir
e;
Ta
nz
an
ia
20
13
M
oz
am
bi
qu
e
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
co
lle
ct
s
w
hi
ch
co
un
tr
ie
s
un
de
r-
w
en
tb
or
de
rc
ha
ng
es
(e
ith
er
sp
lit
or
m
er
ge
rs
)d
ur
in
g
th
e
sa
m
pl
e
pe
ri
od
.
33
Table 2: BORDER CHANGES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN
AFRICA: BASELINE REGRESSIONS
(1) (2) (3)
Split 0.181*** 0.127**
(0.063) (0.064)
Merger 0.453*** 0.417***
(0.104) (0.105)
Pixel FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Pixels 2758 2758 2758
N 60676 60676 60676
a This table collects difference-in-difference regressions that relate border changes in
Africa (splits or mergers) to the log of night light output. The unit of observation are 1
× 1 degree pixels.
b Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
c Standard errors (in paranetheses) are clustered at the pixel-level and robust to het-
eroscedasticity.
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Table 3: BORDER CHANGES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN
AFRICA: REGRESSIONS WITH PIXEL-LEVEL COVARI-
ATES
(1) (2) (3)
Split 0.181*** 0.128**
(0.063) (0.064)
Merger 0.446*** 0.410***
(0.104) (0.106)
Population -0.027 -0.004 -0.011
(0.144) (0.143) (0.144)
Forest cover -0.011 -0.010 -0.010
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Urban share 0.369*** 0.369*** 0.374***
(0.109) (0.106) (0.109)
Young share 67.190 62.355 61.807
(61.386) (65.365) (65.051)
Old share 1.379 0.902 0.631
(16.750) (16.915) (16.902)
Gender ratio -24.191 -23.372 -22.260
(58.068) (58.853) (58.897)
Region FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Regions 2758 2758 2758
N 60676 60676 60676
a This table collects difference-in-difference regressions that relate border changes in
Africa (splits or mergers) to the log of night light output. The unit of observation are 1
× 1 degree pixels.
b Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
c Standard errors (in paranetheses) are clustered at the pixel-level and robust to het-
eroscedasticity.
Table 4: BORDER CHANGES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN AFRICA: RE-
GRESSIONS WITH COUNTRY-SPECIFIC YEAR EFFECTS
(1) (2) (3)
Split 0.161** 0.133*
(0.074) (0.074)
Merger 0.369*** 0.340***
(0.124) (0.124)
Pixel FE Yes Yes Yes
Country-specific year FE Yes Yes Yes
Regions 2758 2758 2758
N 60676 60676 60676
a This table collects difference-in-difference regressions that relate border changes in Africa (splits or
mergers) to the log of night light output. The unit of observation are 1 × 1 degree pixels.
b Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
c Standard errors (in paranetheses) are clustered at the pixel-level and robust to heteroscedasticity.
Table 5: BORDER CHANGES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN AFRICA: ROBUST-
NESS TO DIFFERENT SIZES FOR TREATED UNITS
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: 0.5 × 0.5 grid size
Split 0.250*** 0.204***
(0.043) (0.043)
Merger 0.525*** 0.483***
(0.072) (0.073)
Region FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Regions 10652 10652 10652
N 234344 234344 234344
Panel B: 1992 region boundaries
Split 0.026 -0.095
(0.099) (0.110)
Merger 0.562*** 0.582***
(0.124) (0.132)
Region FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Regions 685 685 685
N 15070 15070 15070
a This table collects difference-in-difference regressions that relate different type of border changes to the log
of night light output to pixels of size 0.5 × 0.5 and regional borders in 1992.
b Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
c Standard errors (in paranetheses) are clustered at the pixel-level and robust to heteroscedasticity.
Table 6: BORDER-INDUCED ETHNIC CHANGES AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Dummy ethnicity variable
Split × Ethnicity(N = 1) -0.130 -0.150
(0.103) (0.103)
Split × Ethnicity(N > 1) 0.261*** 0.201***
(0.076) (0.077)
Merger × Ethnicity(N = 1) 0.281 0.334
(0.221) (0.222)
Merger × Ethnicity(N > 1) 0.468*** 0.404***
(0.116) (0.118)
Pixel FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Pixels 2684 2684 2684
N 59048 59048 59048
Panel B: Continuous ethnicity variable
Split -0.123 -0.126
(0.129) (0.128)
Split × Ethnicity count 0.112** 0.095*
(0.050) (0.049)
Merger 0.050 0.073
(0.261) (0.262)
Merger × Ethnicity count 0.134 0.113
(0.098) (0.098)
Pixel FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Pixels 2684 2684 2684
N 59048 59048 59048
a This table collects interaction models of the count of ethnicities in a 1 × 1 degree pixel with a treatment dummy
on whether that pixel was affected by a merger or split ina specific year and all subsequent years. We relate border
changes in Africa (splits or mergers) to the log of night light output. Panel (A) measures ethnic fractionalization, i.e.
the number of ethnicities in a given pixel as a dummy variable equaling one if identifying more than one ethnicity
in a given pixel. Panel (B) refers to ethnic fractionalization as a continuous variable of all ethnicities observable in
a given pixel. The unit of observation are 1 × 1 degree pixels.
b Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
c Standard errors (in paranetheses) are clustered at the pixel-level and robust to heteroscedasticity.
Table 7: BORDER CHANGES AND CONFLICTS IN AFRICA
(1) (2) (3)
Split -0.165*** -0.167***
(0.061) (0.062)
Merger 0.003 0.020
(0.047) (0.046)
Region FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Regions 2758 2758 2758
N 46886 46886 46886
a This table collects difference-in-difference regressions that relate border changes in
Africa (splits or mergers) to the log of total conflict events. The unit of observation
are 1 × 1 degree pixels.
b Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***). Standard errors (in
paranetheses) are clustered at the pixel-level and robust to heteroscedasticity.
Table 8: BORDER CHANGES AND CONFLICTS IN AFRICA: THE ROLE OF ETHNIC
FRACTIONALIZATION
(1) (2) (3)
Split × Ethnicity(N = 1) -0.039 -0.038
(0.037) (0.037)
Split × Ethnicity(N > 1) -0.208*** -0.210***
(0.080) (0.080)
Merger × Ethnicity(N = 1) -0.013 -0.013
(0.067) (0.068)
Merger × Ethnicity(N > 1) 0.006 0.029
(0.054) (0.053)
Pixel FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Pixels 2684 2684 2684
N 45628 45628 45628
a This table collects interaction models of the count of ethnicities in a 1 × 1 degree pixel with a treatment
dummy on whether that pixel was affected by a merger or split in specific year and all subsequent years.
We relate border changes in Africa (splits or mergers) to the log of conflict counts in a given pixel. The
table measures ethnic fractionalization, i.e. the number of ethnicities in a given pixel as a dummy variable
equaling one if identifying more than one ethnicity in a given pixel. The unit of observation are 1 × 1 degree
pixels. This table collects difference-in-difference regressions that relate border changes in Africa (splits or
mergers) to the log of conflict incidence. The unit of observation are 1 × 1 degree pixels.
b Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
c Standard errors (in paranetheses) are clustered at the pixel-level and robust to heteroscedasticity.
Table 9: BORDER CHANGES AND SUB-NATIONAL ELECTIONS
(1) (2) (3)
Panel B: Growth
Split × Elections 0.396*** 0.325***
(0.093) (0.095)
Split × No Elections 0.026 -0.001
(0.070) (0.072)
Merger × Elections 0.472*** 0.365***
(0.113) (0.113)
Merger × No Elections 0.308 0.333*
(0.198) (0.202)
Elections 0.055 0.088** 0.049
(0.041) (0.039) (0.041)
Pixel FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Pixels 2758 2758 2758
N 60676 60676 60676
Panel B: Conflict
Split × Elections -0.124 -0.128
(0.078) (0.078)
Split × No Elections -0.193*** -0.189***
(0.059) (0.059)
Merger × Elections 0.041 0.041
(0.052) (0.050)
Merger × No Elections -0.095 -0.053
(0.077) (0.073)
Elections -0.007 0.001 -0.008
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Pixel FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Pixels 2758 2758 2758
N 46886 46886 46886
a This table collects interaction models for whether the country into which the largest share of a pixel
falls has sub-national elections and the border change dummies. We relate border changes (splits
and mergers) in Africa to the log of night light output. The dependent variable in Panel (A) is the
log of night light output. The dependent variable in Panel (B) is the log of total conflict events. The
unit of observation are 1 × 1 degree pixels.
b Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
c Standard errors (in paranetheses) are clustered at the pixel-level and robust to heteroscedasticity.
Table 10: BORDER CHANGES AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES: EVIDENCE FROM AFROBAROMETER
(Trust in president) (Support democracy) (Satisfied with
democracy)
(Understand govern-
ment)
(Interest in politics)
Split 0.163*** 0.052*** 0.105*** 0.036 -0.162***
(0.046) (0.020) (0.040) (0.035) (0.024)
Merger -0.075 0.008 0.014 -0.145*** 0.042
(0.082) (0.027) (0.033) (0.019) (0.030)
Pixel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regions 986 1065 1065 799 1065
N 59858 76495 77070 28561 85412
F 7.052 1187.925 17.094 57.721 220.041
a This table collects difference-in-difference regressions that relate border changes in Africa (splits or mergers) to survey evidence on
political attitudes from the Afrobarometer. The unit of observation are individual survey respondents.
b Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
c Standard errors (in paranetheses) are clustered at the pixel-level and robust to heteroscedasticity.
Table 11: BORDER CHANGES AND SERVICE DELIVERY: EVIDENCE
FROM AFROBAROMETER
(Without healthcare) (Without water) (Without food)
Split -0.060** -0.076** -0.068**
(0.029) (0.032) (0.028)
Merger -0.006 0.039 -0.121***
(0.044) (0.060) (0.033)
Pixel FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Regions 1065 1045 1065
N 83050 77641 83247
F 19.656 158.614 23.186
a This table collects difference-in-difference regressions that relate border changes in Africa
(splits or mergers) to survey evidence on service delivery from the Afrobarometer. The unit of
observation are individual survey respondents.
b Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
c Standard errors (in paranetheses) are clustered at the pixel-level and robust to heteroscedastic-
ity.
Table 12: BORDER CHANGES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN AFRICA: CROSS-
COUNTRY DIFFERENCES FROM GOVERNMENT QUALITY
(1) (2) (3)
Split 0.102 0.098
(0.066) (0.068)
Split × Bureaucratic quality 0.459** 0.159
(0.214) (0.232)
Merger 0.296** 0.269**
(0.120) (0.123)
Merger × Bureaucratic quality 0.822** 0.750*
(0.369) (0.402)
Bureaucratic quality -0.152 -0.146 -0.161
(0.175) (0.171) (0.174)
Region FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Regions 2438 2438 2438
N 50148 50148 50148
a This table depicts the interaction effects of border changes in Africa (splits or mergers) with a measure of country-
level institutions, notably its bureaucratic quality. The outcome variable is log of night light output at the 1 × 1
degree pixel-level. Column (1) considers the interaction effects of splits with a continuous variable (bound be-
tween 0 and 1) of government effectiveness from the International Country Risk Guide. Column (2) shows similar
interactions for mergers. Column (3) considers the interactions of both mergers and splits.
b Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
c Standard errors (in paranetheses) are clustered at the pixel-level and robust to heteroscedasticity.
Online appendix
A.1 Fractal dimension of regional borders in Africa
The idea of Alesina et al. (2011) to measure the arbitrariness of borders is to divide a figure of the (non-
coastal) border of a jurisdiction (in their case a country) into boxes of different sizes and to count how
many boxes are crossed by the border. If the number of boxes crossed by a border increases linearly as
the size of the boxes declines, the border is a straight line. In contrast, the more the number of boxes
increases disproportionally as the size of the boxes declines, the more squiggly the underlying border.
More formally, the slope coefficient of a log-log plot of the number of boxes that are crossed by a
border and the total number of boxes into which the figure is divided assumes a value between 1 (linear
line) and 2 (the line crosses every box in the figure and is thus effectively a plane). The specific value is
called the fractal dimension, with higher values indicating more complex borders. When we apply this
method to the (non-coastal) borders of regions in Africa (See subfigure (a) of Appendix Figure A.1),
we obtain a fractal dimension of 1,5268.35 This value in itself is not particularly meaningful. However,
we can compare it with the fractal dimension of first-order regions in other continents such as Europe
(subfigure (b) of Appendix Figure A.1). For the borders of European regions, we obtain a value of
1,5805. Accordingly, the borders of African regions are less squiggly than those of European regions,
suggesting in line with intuition that the borders in Africa are more arbitrary.
For reference, we have also compared the fractional dimensions of African and European country
borders. We obtain a value of 1,2783 for Africa and 1,3811 for Europe. These values are consistent
with the intuition that African national borders are more arbitrary than European borders. Note that the
magnitudes of these values cannot be easily interpreted and arguably have no cardinality. Hence, we
cannot make statements about whether national borders are more or less arbitrary than regional borders.
35Following Alesina et al. (2011), we use the software program ImageJ, which is available at https://imagej.nih.gov/
ij/, to calculate the fractal dimensions after few adjustments from the defaults.
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A.2 Data Appendix for regional elections in Africa
Table A.1: SUBNATIONAL ELECTIONS IN AFRICA IN SAMPLE PERIOD
Country Regional elections
(Years of elections)
Algeria Yes (1997,2002,2007,2012)
Angola No
Botswana Yes (1994,1999,2004,2009)
Cameroon No
Central African Republic No
Chad No
Congo Yes (2002,2008)
Cote d’Ivoire No
Democratic Republic of the Congo Yes (2007)
Equatorial Guinea No
Eritrea Yes (1993,1997,2002,2004)
Gabon No
Gambia Yes (2002,2008,2013)
Ghana Yes (1996,2000,2004,2008,2012)
Guinea-Bissau No
Lesotho Yes (2005,2011)
Liberia No
Libya No
Malawi No
Mali Yes (1999,2004,2009)
Mauritania No
Morocco No
Mozambique Yes (1998,2003,2009)
Namibia Yes (1992,1998,2004,2010)
Niger No
Nigeria Yes (1992,1999,2003,2007,2011)
Rwanda No
Senegal Yes (1996,2002,2009)
Sierra Leone No
Somalia No
South Africa Yes (1994,1999,2004,2009)
Sudan Yes (2010)
Swaziland No
Togo No
Tunisia No
Uganda Yes (1997,2001,2002)
Western Sahara No
Zambia No
Zimbabwe Yes (2013)
Burkina Faso Yes (2012)
Burundi No
Guinea No
Madagascar Yes (2008)
United Republic of Tanzania No
Kenya No
Egypt Yes (2002,2008)
Ethiopia Yes (2000,2005,2010)
Benin Yes (2002,2008)
This table collects information on whether African countries had elections at the regional level
in the 1992–2013 period (election years in parentheses). The sources for this data are available
on request.
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